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M
oney is useful in overcoming two types of frictions. First, in barter
exchange, money helps to mitigate double-coincidence frictions
that arise in developed economies where economic agents are spe-
cialized in production and consumption. Second, in trades involving credit,
informationfrictionsmayimplythatoneeconomicagenthasdifﬁcultygetting
another economic agent to accept his or her IOUs in exchange for goods and
services. Inaneconomywithmonetaryexchange,muchmorecanbeachieved
than in an economy without money. Even so, one of the key lessons of mone-
tary economics is that circumstances exist in which changing the quantity of
money will not matter at all for what can be produced and consumed in an
economy. For example, governments sometimes engage in currency reforms,
particularly in circumstances where there has been a recent history of high
inﬂation.
One such instance occurred in January 2005, when Turkey introduced
a new Turkish lira, equivalent in all respects to the old Turkish lira, except
that one new lira trades for one million old lira. That is, the central bank of
Turkey declared itself willing to exchange old lira for new lira at a rate of one
million to one. What would be the effects of this? To help frame the problem,
suppose that the U.S. government were to announce a currency reform, where
a new U.S. dollar was introduced, deﬁned as being equivalent to 10 old U.S.
dollars. Suppose also that the Federal Reserve did not otherwise change its
behavior. Theresultwouldbethatthemoneystockandallpricesandwagesin
termsofthenewU.S.dollarwouldbeone-tenthofwhattheywouldhavebeen
under the old U.S. dollar, and all real economic activity would be unchanged.
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Money would clearly be neutral under these circumstances. That is, changing
the quantity of money by simply redeﬁning the units in which we measure the
money stock can have no implications for real economic activity.
However, when changing the stock of money through an open market op-
eration, the Federal Reserve System is hardly carrying out a currency reform.
For example, when the Fed conducts an open market operation, the economic
agents on the receiving end of this transaction typically are large ﬁnancial
institutions that are not directly connected to all other economic agents in the
economy through exchange. Initially, an open market operation can affect
only the ﬁnancially interconnected sector of the economy—mainly banks and
otherﬁnancialintermediariesandtheeconomicagentswhotransactfrequently
with these institutions. In contrast to what happens in a currency reform, a
typical open market operation will, in the short run, have different effects in
the ﬁnancially interconnected sector of the economy from what happens in
the decentralized sector of the economy. This difference will be important for
short-run movements in interest rates, aggregate output, and the distribution
of wealth across the population.
Theideathatmonetarypolicymattersintheshortrunbecauseofﬁnancial
disconnectedness in the economy is captured in limited participation models.
The ﬁrst models of this type were constructed by Grossman andWeiss (1983)
and Rotemberg (1984). These early contributions were heterogeneous-agent
models that proved to be very difﬁcult to work with due to complications
in tracking the distribution of wealth across the population over time. Lu-
cas (1990) ﬁnessed these complications by working with a representative-
householdconstruct, asdidFuerst(1992). Laterimportantcontributionswere
madebyAlvarezandAtkeson(1997)andAlvarez,Atkeson,andKehoe(2002).
Much of this research, which focuses mainly on the asset pricing implications
of limited participation, is weak on the microfoundations of money and, as
a result, may be misleading. More recently, Williamson (forthcoming) and
Shi (2004) constructed monetary search models that treat monetary exchange
seriouslyandpermitthestudyoftheroleoflimitedparticipationingenerating
short-run nonneutralities of money.
This article reviews the literature on limited participation and points out
new directions for research by constructing and building on a baseline limited
participation model. The baseline model is a cash-in-advance model similar
totheonestudiedinLucas(1990).1 Iﬁrstshowhowlimitedparticipationpro-
vides an explanation for the liquidity effect—the short-run negative response
of the nominal interest rate to an open market purchase. The baseline model
does not provide a rationale for monetary policy though, as in this setup mon-
etary policy has no implications for real economic variables and economic
1 I do not provide a rigorous microfoundation for monetary exchange in this model, but it
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welfare. As I discuss in Section 2, an extension of the baseline model along
thelinesofFuerstproducesashort-runnonneutralityofmoneyinthatanopen
market purchase of interest-bearing government securities by the central bank
reduces the nominal interest rate, increases the real wage, and increases real
output. In that environment, however, it would be optimal for the monetary
authority not to intervene in the economy.
The conclusion from examining the implications of the ﬁrst two versions
of the model is that, while these variations provide an explanation for the
liquidity effect, they do not teach us much about the real effects of monetary
policy or how to conduct policy.
In Section 3, in the third incarnation of the model, I extend the framework
in a new direction by permitting a persistent distributional effect of monetary
policy. Here, money is nonneutral whether monetary intervention is antici-
pated or not (a feature not shared with the previous two incarnations of this
model). In this version of the model, characterizing the effects of monetary
policy is difﬁcult without getting outside the scope of this article, but de-
termining the model’s implications for optimal monetary policy is relatively
straightforward. Here, optimal monetary policy is in one sense a Friedman
rule (the nominal interest rate is always zero at the optimum), but in another
sense is much more complicated than a typical Friedman rule. This complica-
tion arises because the goal of the monetary authority is to control monetary
conditions in the ﬁnancially disconnected sector of the economy, but mon-
etary control can be achieved only indirectly—through intervention in the
ﬁnancially connected sector of the economy. Finally, Section 4 serves as a
conclusion.
1. LIMITED PARTICIPATIONAND THE LIQUIDITY EFFECT
This section contains the baseline model—closely related to the model in
Lucas (1990)—used throughout this article. Lucas considered a simple asset-
pricing model without production, while my model allows for production and
endogenous labor supply. As well, there are some minor differences from
Lucas’s work in how I specify asset markets.
The Representative Household





where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information in period 0;
β is the household’s discount factor with 0 <β<1; ct is the household’s
consumption; and nt is household labor supply. Assume that u(·) is strictly4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable with u (0) =∞ , and
that v(·) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice differentiable with
v (0) = 0 and v (h) =∞where h is the household’s endowment of time each
period. The household has a technology that permits it to produce one unit of
the perishable consumption good in period t for each unit of labor supplied.
One of the innovations in Lucas (1990) was to model a household as
having many agents, with household members engaged in different activities
during each period. This device is used here, and its purpose is to make the
model analytically tractable in that monetary policy in this model will only
cause changes in the distribution of wealth within the household and within
a period, not persistent changes in the distribution of wealth across economic
agents. Thus, in the baseline version of the model, the household consists of
three agents: a worker, a shopper, and a ﬁnancial transactor.
As is typical in models with cash-in-advance constraints, the timing of
transactions within a period is critical to how the model works. At the begin-
ningoftheperiod,thehouseholdhasMt unitsofmoneyonhandandmustthen
decide how to split these money balances between the shopper, who will go
to the goods market to purchase consumption goods from other households,
andtheﬁnancialtransactor, whowillgototheassetmarkettopurchaseassets.
Let Xt denote the quantity of money that the household sends to the goods
market with the shopper, where Xt ≤ Mt. For the shopper, the value of goods
purchased cannot exceed Xt; that is, the shopper faces the cash-in-advance
constraint
Ptct ≤ Xt, (1)
where Pt is the price level, the price of consumption goods in terms of money.
Now, in the asset market I will assume that there is only one asset bought
and sold, which is a nominal bond issued by the government. One nominal
government bond issued in period t sells at a price qt in terms of money and
is a promise to pay one unit of money at the end of the period. Bonds must
be purchased with money, so the ﬁnancial transactor, like the shopper, faces a
cash-in-advance constraint, which in this case is
qtBt ≤ Mt − Xt. (2)
The worker stays at the household’s location where he produces and sells
goods to other households. As is usual in cash-in-advance models, I assume
that the household cannot consume its own output and that money acquired
by the household from the sale of its output cannot be used within the period
to purchase consumption goods or government bonds. The household then
faces the budget constraint
Ptct + Mt+1 + qtBt ≤ Mt + Bt + Ptztnt − ϒt, (3)
where Mt+1 is the quantity of money that the household carries into period
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governmentattheendoftheperiod. Theleft-handsideofthebudgetconstraint
(3) consists of the value of consumption goods purchased by the shopper, plus
money balances at the end of the period, plus the value of bonds purchased
by the ﬁnancial transactor. On the right-hand side is the quantity of money
possessedbythehouseholdatthebeginningoftheperiod,plusthetotalpayoff
on government bonds held by the household, plus the proceeds from sales of
goods by the worker, minus the lump-sum tax paid to the government. It may
seemunusualtohavegovernmentbondpurchasesBt appearontheright-hand
and left-hand sides of the budget constraint (3). However, these are within-
period bonds for which the household gives up qtBt units of money on the
assetmarketandreceivesBt unitsofmoneyasapayoffattheendoftheperiod.
The Government
Each period, the government must choose the quantity of nominal bonds to
issue, which I denote by Bt (I will use overbar throughout to denote the
supplies of assets determined by the government). I will assume that
Bt = θt+1Mt, (4)
whereMt isthequantityofmoneyoutstandingatthebeginningofperiodt and
θt+1isarandomvariablethatisnotrealizeduntilaftertheshopperandﬁnancial
transactor have left the household in period t.At this point, perceptive readers
might quarrel with the assumption that the government behaves randomly.
This assumption proves useful in making my argument, and I will comment
later on what happens if θt+1 is a choice variable for the central bank.
To obtain a clean policy experiment in the model, I will assume that the
government sets the lump-sum tax ϒt so that the money stock at the end of
the period is identical to the beginning-of-period money stock. That is,
ϒt = (1 − qt)Bt. (5)
Given equation (5), the money stock will remain ﬁxed for all time, and θt will
not affect the money growth rate. The following is one interpretation of how
policyisconductedinthismodel, consistentwiththenotionthatitisdesirable
here to set up the policy experiment so that it captures monetary policy and is
notsomemixofﬁscalandmonetarypolicies. Eachperiod, theﬁscalauthority
issues ˆ θMt nominalbonds,where ˆ θ denotesthemaximumpossiblerealization
of θt+1. Then, the central bank determines (randomly) how much of the bond
issue to acquire from the ﬁscal authority, purchasing
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end of the period, the ﬁscal authority has qtθt+1Mt units of money acquired
from bond sales and must pay the bondholders θt+1Mt units of money, as
promised. Itthenmakesupthedifference(1−qt)θt+1Mt throughalump-sum
taxontherepresentativehousehold,sothatthetaxisgivenby(5). Transactions6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
between the ﬁscal authority and the central bank merely yield accounting
entries, and the central bank’s account balance with the ﬁscal authority is
reset to zero at the end of each period.
Assume that information is not transmitted during the period between the
asset market and the goods market, so workers and shoppers do not learn θt+1
until the end of the period after all decisions have been made.
Optimization and Equilibrium
To specify the household’s optimization problem in a tractable way, it proves
useful to divide the left-hand and right-hand sides of equations (1) through
(3) by Mt and let lower-case variables denote the corresponding upper-case
variable scaled by the money supply, pt ≡
Pt
Mt , for example. For convenience,
assume for now that θt is an i.i.d.random variable. Further, drop t subscripts
andletprimesdenotevariablesdatedt +1.Then, Icanspecifytherepresenta-
tive household’s optimization problem as a dynamic program, where V(m,θ)




u(c) − v(n) + βEθ max




pc ≤ x, (7)
qb ≤ m − x,and (8)
pc + m  + qb ≤ m + b + pn− τ. (9)
In the objective function (6), Eθ is the expectation operator conditional on
information before θ  is known, while Eθ  conditions on θ .
To solve the household’s problem, ﬁrst note that the optimal choice of b




, if q ≤ 1, and (10)
b = 0, if q>1.
Giventhatthegovernmentalwaysissuesastrictlypositivequantityofnominal
bonds, we must have q ≤ 1 in equilibrium, so conﬁning attention to this case
and substituting for b in (9) using (10) gives
pc + m  ≤ m +
(m − x)(1 − q)
q
+ pn− τ. (11)
I can then specify the household’s problem as solving (6) subject to (7) and
(11). Let λ1 and λ2 denote the multipliers associated with constraints (7) and
(11), respectively. From the choice of m  in the inner maximization in (6), IS. D. Williamson: Limited Participation 7
obtaintheﬁrstordercondition(assumingthevaluefunctionisstrictlyconcave
and differentiable, and using the relevant envelope condition),







and the choices of x, c, and n in the outer maximization problem in (6) give










u (c) − p(λ1 + Eθλ2) = 0, and (14)
−v (n) + pEθλ2 = 0. (15)
In equilibrium, the bond market clears, or
b = θ ; (16)
the representative household willingly holds the existing stock of money, or
m = 1; (17)
and the market for consumption goods clears, or
c = n. (18)
Given the assumption that θ is an i.i.d.random variable, I can solve for an
equilibrium in which x,c,n,and p are constant. First assume that the cash-
in-advance constraint (7) binds. Then, (12) through (18) give
x = 1 − βE(θ), (19)
v (c) − βu (c) = 0, (20)









In (19) through (23), E(θ) is the expected value of θ. Note, from (19)
that the fraction of money balances allocated to the shopper for the purchase
of consumption goods is decreasing in the expected size of the government’s
open market operation. Monetary policy has no effect on any variables of
consequence,asequation(20)determinesconsumption(equaltolaborsupply)
and, thus, c is independent of θ and the distribution of θ.The only effect of θ
is on the price of the nominal bond q in equation (23). Clearly q is decreasing8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in θ, so that the nominal interest rate increases as θ increases. This is the
liquidity effect—if the government withdraws more outside money through
an open market sale, the nominal interest rate will be higher.
An interesting feature of the setup here is that I have designed the policy
experiment to imply no Fisher effect—the positive effect of money growth
and inﬂation on the nominal interest rate. Because monetary policy leaves the
money supply constant over time, the only effect on the nominal interest rate
is the liquidity effect. Note that the presence of E(θ) in equations (19), (22),
and (23) has nothing to do with the Fisher effect. Instead, if E(θ)is high, then
itisexpectedthatahigherquantityofbondswillbesoldtoprivateagents, and
the household therefore also predicts that the expected payoff from holding
government bonds will be higher. Thus, the household will tend to allocate
more cash to the asset market as opposed to the goods market (x declines in
equation (19)). Both the price level and the price of the nominal bond are in
turn determined in part by x,as (22) and (23) indicate.
It is straightforward to show that, given the solutions (19) through (23),
we will have λ1 > 0, so that the cash-in-advance constraint binds. As well,
my solution requires that q ≤ 1 in equilibrium, so from (23) we require that
θ ≥ βE(θ) for all realizations of the random variable θ.
The implication of this model is that, while monetary policy can produce
variabilityinthenominalinterestrate,policyisirrelevantforeconomicwelfare
as it does not affect consumption and employment. The fact that the asset
market and goods market are segmented implies that nominal interest rate
movements will have no real effects. Note as well that the price level is in
some sense “sticky,” as in equation (22) p does not depend on θ—monetary
policy can change the supply of liquidity in the asset market but has no effect
on the quantity of money in the goods market. However, p depends on E(θ),
soanticipatedmonetarypolicymattersforthedeterminationofthepricelevel,
though not for any real variables of consequence.
If the model as it stands were a good description of reality, we would
concludethatcentralbankinterventioninassetmarketswasauselessexercise.
The central bank might just as well do nothing rather than cause the nominal




2 In my opinion, belief in the liquidity effect by central bankers is much like religious belief:
It seems impossible to disprove its existence because of the endogeneity of the money stock brought
about by endogenous policy and the endogenous response of the banking system to exogenous
shocks to the economy. If monetary policy were exogenous, then it would be straightforward to
measure the effect of a money shock on nominal interest rates. The problem is that the right
natural experiment does not appear to have occurred in practice.S. D. Williamson: Limited Participation 9
or how it should be conducted. To address these matters, I need to modify the
baseline model in ways that make money nonneutral.
2. LIMITED PARTICIPATION WITH REAL EFFECTS ON
OUTPUT
Inthissection, Ialterthebaselinemodelconstructedintheprevioussectionto
produce nonneutralities of short-run monetary policy. The basic idea comes
from Fuerst (1992).
In the baseline model, I assumed that a household must buy consumption
goods from other households with cash acquired in advance of the current
period. The extension here is to assume that the household can produce only
with labor supplied by other households and that labor, like consumption
goods, is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. To be more explicit, the
timing works as follows: At the beginning of the period, the representative
householdhasMt unitsofmoneyandsendsXt unitsofmoneywiththeshopper
to the goods market. The worker also leaves the household at the same time
as the shopper to sell labor to other households. The ﬁnancial transactor is
left behind to trade on the asset market and to purchase yt units of labor at the
real wage rate of wt from other households, using the remaining quantity of
money balances, Mt −Xt. Using the same notation as in the previous section,
replace the constraint (8) with
qb+ pwy ≤ m − x, (24)
and rewrite the household’s budget constraint as
pc + m  + qb+ pwy ≤ m + b + pwn+ py − τ. (25)












subject to (7), (24), and (25). Note that on the right-hand side of the Bellman
equation (26) the household must choose x, the fraction of cash sent with the
shopper, before the central bank intervenes in the asset market, but all other
household choices are made with knowledge of the central bank’s action θ ,
albeit with x already locked in place. That is, θ  is revealed to the shopper
through the price p and to the worker through the real wage rate w.
Now, giventhatθ isani.i.d.randomvariableandthatthecentralbanksets
the lump sum tax at the end of the period according to (5) so as to keep the
aggregate money stock constant from period to period, it is straightforward
to characterize the effects of monetary policy on prices, the nominal interest
rate, and output. Let λ1,λ 2, and λ3 denote the multipliers associated with the
constraints (7), (24), and (25), respectively. An equilibrium is the solution to:
Eθ(λ1) = Eθ(λ2), (27)10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
u (c) − p(λ1 + λ3) = 0, (28)
−v (n) + pwλ3 = 0, (29)
−w(λ2 + λ3) + λ3 = 0, (30)
−qλ2 + (1 − q)λ3 = 0, and (31)
−λ3 + βEθ (λ 
2 + λ 
3) = 0, (32)
in addition to (7), (24), and (25). This solution is derived from the ﬁrst order
conditions characterizing a solution to the constrained optimization problem
on the right-hand side of (26), the relevant envelope conditions, arbitrage
conditions, (16) through (18), and the equilibrium condition y = n.
From(30)and(31),aninterestingfeatureoftheequilibriumisthatw = q,
so that the real wage and the price of the nominal bond are identical, and this




received at the end of the period. In equilibrium, the ﬁnancial transactor must
be indifferent between purchasing labor and acquiring a bond, which requires
that w = q.Then, if the second cash-in-advance constraint (30) binds so that
λ2 > 0, we will have q = w<1, or the nominal interest rate is positive and
the real wage is less than labor’s marginal product. That is, cash received for
output cannot be spent until the next period, so no missed proﬁt opportunity
necessarily results if the market wage is less than labor’s marginal product
(w<1).
Now, for convenience, consider an equilibrium where both of the cash-in-
advance constraints (7) and (24) bind for all θ. First, given that θ is an i.i.d.
random variable, x will be independent of θ in equilibrium. Then, given x,
from (7), (24), (25), and (27) through (32), w, q, and c are the solutions to















From (33), the real wage and the price of the nominal bond are decreasing in
θ.Therefore, a larger open market sale implies a higher nominal interest rate
andalowerrealwagebecauseofthetighteningofthesecondcash-in-advanceS. D. Williamson: Limited Participation 11
constraint (24). Thus, as in the baseline model in the previous section, a
liquidity effect exists, but here this effect extends to a change in the wage rate.
Inaddition,arealeffectofmonetarypolicynowexists. Asmalleropenmarket
purchase (smaller θ)relaxes the second cash-in-advance constraint (24) from
equation (34), implying that the demand for labor rises, and in equilibrium,
the increased demand leads not only to an increase in the wage rate but also
to an increase in employment, output, and consumption. That is, in equation
(34), theleft-handsideisincreasinginc,andtheright-handsideisdecreasing
in θ,so that c is decreasing in θ.
The nonneutrality of money here works in an essentially identical manner
to the mechanism in Fuerst (1992), which was later adapted in work by Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1995). In these models an additional embellishment
makes the model seem more plausible. Rather than having the representative
household purchase labor directly subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, as
is the case here, Fuerst, for example, supposes that a ﬁnancial intermediary
takes cash deposits from the household and makes cash loans to ﬁrms and that
the ﬁrm then pays workers in cash. This construct amounts to the same thing
as speciﬁed here—labor is purchased subject to a cash-in-advance constraint,
highlighting a key defect in this attempt to understand the short-run role for
monetary policy. In the United States, few workers are paid in cash, and even
if they are, it seems difﬁcult to argue that ﬁrms subject to cash-in-advance
constraints account for a signiﬁcant fraction of U.S. employment. Most ﬁrms
have sufﬁcient access to banking services and ﬁnancial markets so that they
will not face serious cash constraints in paying their workers. To see why this
fact is important in the model, suppose that the representative household can
issue IOUs in order to pay workers and purchase government bonds on the
assetmarket,withtheIOUsbeingrepaidattheendoftheperiod(equivalentin
the Fuerst [1992] model to allowing the “bank” to issue within-period IOUs).
Then the nominal interest rate is zero in equilibrium, the liquidity effect goes
away, and output is constant for all θ in my model.
Another problem with this extension of the baseline model is that it does
not provide a rationale for short-run central bank intervention. In spite of
the fact that the central bank can cause the nominal interest rate, employ-
ment, output, and consumption to ﬂuctuate, these ﬂuctuations are inefﬁcient.
Randomness in θ implies randomness in consumption, only making the risk-
averse representative household worse off. One way to resurrect a role for
monetary policy in this model might be to add a shock to productivity that is
not learned until after the representative household has chosen x.In this case,
conductingopenmarketoperationstovarythequantityofliquidityintheasset
(labor) market in response to the technology shock would be efﬁcient for the
central bank. The conjecture is that an optimal policy would involve “leaning
against the wind” by injecting more liquidity when the technology shock is
high, which would relax the household’s second cash-in-advance constraint12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
whenthedemandforlaborishigh. Thisrationaleformonetarypolicyrelieson
the central bank being capable of acting faster than private agents to increase
liquidity in the asset market. As well, this rationale relies on cash-in-advance
producers, which is problematic, as discussed above.
Perhaps a more plausible approach to the nonneutrality of money and
liquidity effects in this vein is taken in Williamson (2004a), in a model where
cash-in-advance constraints are derived endogenously from ﬁrst principles,
and these cash-in-advance constraints apply to purchases of retail and whole-
salegoods. Creditispermittedsothattheresultsdonotdependonallpurchases
being made with outside money. A key result in Williamson (2004a) is that
permitting private intermediaries to issue close substitutes for government-
providedoutsidemoneyaltersthenatureofcash-in-advanceconstraints, takes
away the liquidity effect, and substantially changes optimal monetary policy
rules.
3. LIMITED PARTICIPATIONAND THE DISTRIBUTIONAL
EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY
Muchoftheliteratureonlimitedparticipationandmonetarypolicyhasfocused
on liquidity effects in asset markets (e.g., Lucas [1990],Alvarez andAtkeson
[1997],Alvarez,AtkesonandKehoe[2002])whileneglectingtheimplications
of limited participation for the distributional effects of monetary policy on
output, consumption, and wealth. The heterogenous agent models studied by




across economic agents. Indeed, these distributional effects may be very
important for how monetary policy works, if not the reason we should care
about monetary policy.
In focusing on asset pricing implications, those working in the limited
participation literature have also paid scant attention to normative issues. As I
have shown in the previous two sections, my baseline model (which captures
thekeyresultsintheliterature)doesnothavemuchtosayabouthowtoconduct
monetary policy. Focusing almost exclusively on optimal monetary policy, as
I do here, will be helpful in showing how interesting policy conclusions arise
when we are serious about modeling the distributional effects of monetary
policy. The model here can also be used to explore the dynamic effects of
monetary injections on output, prices, consumption, and interest rates, but
that would turn this into a much longer article than the editor would allow.
In this section, I will modify the baseline model to incorporate distribu-
tional effects of monetary policy. To cleanly focus on these effects, I will
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section come fromWilliamson (forthcoming), but the model studied there is a
monetary search model that builds on Lagos and Wright (forthcoming). The
Lagos-Wright model is an approach to handling the distribution of wealth in
search models with monetary exchange through the use of quasi-linear prefer-
encesratherthanarepresentativehousehold. Icancapturethesameideashere
as in Williamson (forthcoming) by extending my baseline cash-in-advance
model. Though typical cash-in-advance models lack the microfoundations
that make monetary search models such as Lagos and Wright (forthcoming)
and Williamson (forthcoming) attractive, it is possible to generate cash-in-
advance constraints while remaining true to monetary fundamentals, as, for
example, in Williamson (2004a).
Suppose now that the representative household consists of two shoppers,
two workers, and a continuum of ﬁnancial transactors with mass 2, and that
two locations, denoted location 1 and location 2, exist. One shopper and
one worker live at each location, and a unit mass of ﬁnancial transactors
is always at each location. At the beginning of the period, a unit mass of
ﬁnancial transactors arrives at each location to deliver beginning-of-period
moneybalances. Inlocation1, theshopperbuysgoodsfromotherhouseholds
on credit. That is, the shopper exchanges IOUs for goods, and the IOUs are
redeemed by the household at the end of the period. At location 2, shoppers
buygoodswithmoney. Theworkerateachlocationsellsgoodsinexchangefor
IOUs at location 1 and for money at location 2. At the end of the period, after
IOUsclear, theﬁnancialtransactorstakepossessionofthehousehold’smoney
balances. Financialtransactorsarethenrandomlyallocated(bynature)toeach
location. A ﬁnancial transactor who is at a given location at the end of the
period will be at the other location with probability π and in the same location
with probability 1 − π, where 0 <π<1. Given the random relocation
of ﬁnancial transactors, it is optimal for the household to allocate its money
balances equally among ﬁnancial transactors within a location.
The reason the ﬁnancial transactors play the role they do in this version of
themodelistohaveaconvenientdeviceforallowingmoneytodiffusethrough
the economy. I could have accomplished a similar goal by having economic
agents randomly allocated to the two locations to buy or sell goods. The key
feature of the model I need to achieve my results is some friction associated
with moving money and goods across locations. The exact form this friction
takes is not so important, and for my purposes it is convenient that producers
and consumers cannot move and that the household can move money across
locations, though in a random fashion.
For convenience I have included only one asset—money—in this version
of the model, so I cannot model central bank intervention as open market
operations. Here, the government injects money into the economy through
lump-sum transfers, which, for my purposes, is harmless in that the policy
implications should not be qualitatively different from what I would get with14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
a pure monetary policy experiment. The household receives the transfer at
location 1 before ﬁnancial transactors are randomly relocated. It is a key
feature of the model that only some agents (those at location 1) receive the
money transfer. Note also that the transfer is received by agents who have
access to the more sophisticated transactions technology that involves within-
periodcredit,capturingthefactthatcentralbankinterventionoccursinmarkets
where ﬁnancial transactions are relatively more complex than in other sectors
of the economy.
In this version of the model, it will be interesting to explore optimal
monetary policy in the context of aggregate shocks to the economy, so I will
add an aggregate technology shock. Assume that one unit of labor produces
φt units of the consumption good in period t, where φt follows a ﬁrst order
Markovprocess. Ididnotconsidertechnologyshocksinthepreviousversions
of the model because the implications of doing so would be no different from
those obtained in standard cash-in-advance models. Studying the behavior of
the economy under technology shocks will yield important new results in this
instance.
Since consumption goods cannot be moved between locations, consump-
tion will in general differ between the two locations. It will be useful to
suppose that the shoppers in the household do the consuming, with cit de-
noting consumption by the shopper at location i. Similarly, nit denotes labor




βt [u(c1t) + u(c2t) − v(n1t) − v(n2t)]. (36)
The household must abide by its budget constraint at location 1,
P1tc1t + M1,t+1 ≤ P1tφtn1t + (1 − π)M1t + πM2t + ϒt, (37)
where Pit denotes the price of goods in terms of money at location i, Mit is
the quantity of money held by the household at location i at the end of period
t −1, and ϒt is the lump-sum money transfer from the government. As well,
the household must satisfy the cash-in-advance constraint at location 2,
P2tc2t ≤ πM1t + (1 − π)M2t. (38)
Finally, the household faces its budget constraint at location 2,
P2tc2t + M2,t+1 ≤ P2tφtn2t + πM1t + (1 − π)M2t. (39)
Let Mit+1 denote the money supply in location i in period t after the
governmentexecutesthetransferandbeforeﬁnancialtransactorsarerelocated.
Then
M1,t+1 = (1 − π)M1t + πM2t + ϒt+1, and (40)
M2,t+1 = πM1t + (1 − π)M2t. (41)S. D. Williamson: Limited Participation 15
Asintheprevioussections, Icanwritethehousehold’soptimizationprob-
lem as a dynamic program with analogous notation, except that the scaling
variable I use is M2t, the quantity of money in location 2. Let zit denote the




through (41), the household’s dynamic programming problem is





u(c1) + u(c2) − v(n1) − v(n2)
+βEtV(m  
1,m  
2,φ ,z   
2)], (42)
subject to
p1c1 + z 
2m 
1 ≤ p1φn1 + (1 − π)m1 + πm2 + τ, (43)
p2c2 ≤ πm1 + (1 − π)m2, and (44)
p2c2 + z 
2m 
2 ≤ p2φn2 + πm1 + (1 − π)m2. (45)
Then, assuming that the cash-in-advance constraint (44) binds, and given the
equilibrium conditions πm1 +(1−π)m2 = 1 (money demand equals money
supply at location 2) and ci = φni for i = 1,2 (the demand for consumption
goods equals the supply at each location), the ﬁrst order conditions from the
optimization problem on the right-hand side of the Bellman equation (42)
yield
u (φn1)φ − v (n1) = 0, (45a)
which solves for n1. The ﬁrst order conditions and the appropriate envelope
conditions yield the two Euler equations
z 
2v (n2)n2 = βEt
	






















First, consider the case where there is no uncertainty about productivity; that
is, φt is known at date 0 for all t. This setup is useful for studying how the
central bank should behave in response to predictable events. While some of
these predictable events—having to do with the day of the week, the month
of the year, or the time until the end of the reserve-averaging period—are
not necessarily appropriately modeled as related to aggregate productivity,16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the case of predictable productivity ﬂuctuations will nevertheless be quite
instructive.




z2,t+1v (n2t)n2t = β
	










for t = 0,1,2,... . The ﬁrst important implication is that money is not neutral
here because of a distribution effect. Suppose, for example, that productivity
isconstant,orφt = 1forallt,andthatthestocksofmoneyinlocations1and2
in period 0 are γM 0 and M0, respectively, where γ>0.After date 0, suppose
that there are no transfers, so that the aggregate money stock is constant for all
time. In typical monetary models, γ would have no effect on real aggregate
variables; that is, money would be neutral. Here, n1t = n1 for all t,where n1
is the solution to (45a) with φ = 1. However, γ matters for the determination
of {n2t}∞
t=0, as from (40) and (41) γ will affect z2t for each t = 1,2,..., which
will, in turn, affect {ψt}∞
t=0 and {n2t}∞
t=0 from (48) and (49). I will not go
into detail here concerning the qualitative and quantitative nonneutralities of
money in this model, as I want to focus in this section on optimal monetary













Then, the ﬁrst order condition for an optimum gives
φtu (φtn∗
t ) − v (n∗
t ) = 0. (50)
Clearly, from (45a) and (50), employment is optimal in location 1, but em-
ployment will in general be suboptimal in location 2. From (48) through














The optimal allocation is then achieved in an equilibrium where













so that the substitution effect dominates the income effect on labor supply for
the household, then from (50), n∗
t is increasing in φt. Therefore, since v (n)n
is increasing in n, the optimal money growth rate at location 2 in period t
is increasing in φt and decreasing in φt−1. That is, the key monetary policy
variable is the growth rate of the money stock in location 2, since location
2 is where transactions are conducted with outside money. At the optimum,
monetary policy needs to correct for intertemporal price distortions due to
(1) a suboptimal long-run rate of return on money and (2) the distortions
introduced because output ﬂuctuates in response to ﬂuctuating productivity.
To correct the ﬁrst distortion, the money stock will tend to grow at the rate of
time preference; note from (51) that if φt is constant for all t, then z∗
2,t+1 = β
for all t.To correct the second distortion, since the price level will tend to be
low when productivity and output are high (assuming (52)), money growth
should be high when productivity is high.
The optimal money growth rule speciﬁed by (51) is typical of the opti-
mal Friedman rules implied by representative-agent type monetary models
in common use in macroeconomics. Friedman’s (1969) prescription was to
conductmonetarypolicysothatthenominalinterestrateiszeroinallstatesof
the world. Though I have so far ignored the determination of nominal interest
ratesinthissection,astandardapproachtopricinganominalbondwouldyield
a zero nominal interest rate, given (51). Thus, so far nothing seems surprising
about the implications for optimal monetary policy coming out of this model.
However,themoneygrowthratesspeciﬁedbyequation(51)areforthegrowth
rates of the money stock in location 2 only. Note that the government controls
these money growth rates only indirectly, through monetary intervention in
location 1. It would be useful to see what (51) implies for the behavior of
the money stock in location 1. Using (40), (41), and (51), the optimal money





2,t+1 + π − 1
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The optimal money growth rule given by (51) and (53) is more complicated
than the simple Friedman rule in (51). This is because the indirect control of
the money stock at location 2 through money injections and withdrawals at
location1requiresthatthemonetaryauthoritytakeaccountofhowthepattern
of transactions diffuses money through the economy. In particular, note the
role of π in determining the optimal money growth rate in location 1, where
π governs the speed of diffusion of money through the economy. If π = 1
2,
then diffusion occurs in one period, while there is no diffusion if π = 0o r18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
π = 1. The speed of diffusion increases with π for 0 <π<1
2 and decreases




and (53) to the case where φt is an arbitrary ﬁrst order Markov process. Here
I want to consider how the monetary authority should react to unanticipated
shocks to productivity that may be serially correlated. As in the previous
subsection, a social optimum is nit = n∗
t , for i = 1,2, where n∗
t is the















and, as before, given the optimal money growth factor for location 2 from
(54), the optimal money growth factor for location 1 is speciﬁed by (53).
Similar to the previous subsection, the optimal money growth rule speci-
ﬁed by (54) and (53) has features similar to a standard Friedman rule in that
the money stock at location 2 grows at the rate of time preference, modiﬁed
by the corrections necessary for anticipated optimal growth in real output.
Also, the optimal rate of growth in the money supply at location 1 follows a
much more complicated rule for the same reasons as discussed in the previous
subsection.
It may seem puzzling that the monetary authority can manipulate the
money supply to achieve an optimal allocation, in spite of the fact that pro-
duction and consumption occurs in two locations and the monetary authority
can intervene directly only in one location. Critical to this result is that mone-
taryexchangeoccursonlyatlocation2,thattheimportantmonetaryvariableis
next period’s money growth rate at location 2, and that the monetary authority
can control that variable perfectly through current transfers at location 1. An
interesting extension of this framework, which relates to my current research,
is to allow for monetary exchange in both locations. In that case, the prices
at which money trades for goods will in general differ across locations, and
Friedman rules cease to be optimal monetary policy. This extension is much
harder to study but could be potentially very fruitful for thinking about the
role of monetary policy in actual economies.
4. CONCLUSION
While limited participation asset-pricing models such as the one studied by
Lucas(1990)provideanexplanationfortheliquidityeffectofmonetarypolicy
on nominal interest rates, these models do not provide a rationale for centralS. D. Williamson: Limited Participation 19
bankingoranyguidanceastohowacentralbankshouldbehave. Extensionsof
thesemodels, suchasinFuerst(1992), thatallowfornonneutralitiesofmoney
lack plausibility, as they constrain ﬁrms to use cash in situations where their
real-world counterparts use credit. In the latter part of this article I explored
an extension of limited participation models that takes seriously the idea that
monetary policy matters in the short run through its effects on the distribution
of wealth across the population.
In ongoing research, I intend to explore further the qualitative and quanti-
tative implications of a related class of limited participation models for mon-
etary policy. These models represent a serious alternative to the sticky-price
and sticky-wage Keynesian models that have been popular in recent policy
analysis.
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